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Introduction 
In the 1990s the former Yugoslavia, and in particular Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH), was ravaged by violent conflict. As a result, BiH 
has been under the tutelage of different international and regional 
actors since the signing of the Dayton peace agreements in 1995, 
including the Office of the High Representative (OHR).1 These 
actors first rebuilt physical and infrastructural damage and 
subsequently monitored BiH’s democratization process to strengthen 
its political institutions and support its war-torn society during the 
post-conflict transition. Several authors argue that despite numerous 
reform initiatives BiH’s society continues to grapple with ethnic 
divisions, which fuel persistent political crises and institutional 
instability.2 In addition to the political turmoil at both the federal and 
                                                 
1 The OHR is an ad hoc international institution that oversees the implementation 
of the peace agreement and represents the countries involved in the peace accords 
through the Peace and Implementation Council. For more information see OHR 
website at http://www.ohr.int/, accessed February 20, 2012. While its current head 
the Austrian Valentin Inzko used to also be the European Union (EU) Special 
Representative for BiH, since 2011, the EU has decided to appoint a separate 
representative for this position. Currently, Peter Sørensen, from Denmark has been 
chosen for the EU Special Representative position. The aim of decoupling both 
positions is to prepare BiH for the EU accession process, according to the EU. 
2 Florian Bieber, “Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Preparing for 
EU Accession,” Policy Brief European Policy Center, 2010; Roberto Belloni, “Bosnia: 
Dayton Is Dead! Long Live Dayton!” Nationalism & Ethnic Politics 15.3–4 (2009): 
355–75; Bruce Hitchner, “From Dayton to Brussels: The Story Behind the 
1
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state level, Bosnian civil society fell below expectations of Western 
aid actors and evaluations of international nongovernmental 
organizations (INGOs), which operated in the region with funding 
from Western donors.3 Ironically, in spite of weak civil society 
structures, early literature on development aid and democracy 
promotion examined why donors showed a greater interest in 
providing assistance to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
rather than to government institutions.4  Although this trend applies 
to the overall political and democratic transition processes in BiH,5 
this study illustrates that development aid for transitional justice 
strategies does not follow this pattern. On the contrary, international 
government donors have been reluctant to support civil society 
initiatives, and instead favor government-backed projects. 
 In view of a growing debate on the role of civil society in 
transitional justice processes around the world,6 this article examines 
                                                                                                             
Constitutional and Governmental Reform Process in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 
The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30 (2006): 125. 
3 Roberto Belloni, “Civil Society in War-to-Democracy Transitions,” in From War to 
Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, ed. Anna Jarstad (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 182–211; Martina Fischer, Peacebuilding and Civil Society in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ten Years after Dayton (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2005); Adam Fagan, 
“Civil Society in Bosnia Ten Years after Dayton,” International Peacekeeping  12.3 
(2005): 406–19; David Chandler, “Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil 
Society Building Strategies,” Democratization 5.4 (1998): 78–102. 
4 Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and 
Democracy Promotion (Carnegie Endowment, 2000); Gordon Crawford, “Promoting 
Democracy from Without - Learning from Within (Part I),” Democratization 10.1 
(2003): 77–98. 
5 Chandler, “Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil Society Building 
Strategies;” Adam Fagan, “Transnational Aid for Civil Society Development in 
Post-Socialist Europe: Democratic Consolidation or a New Imperialism?” Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics 22.1 (2006): 115–34; Jorgen Skov Sorensen, 
“Pluralism or Fragmentation,” War Report 35 (1997). 
6 David Androff, “Can Civil Society Reclaim Truth? Results from a Community-
Based Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” The International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 6.2 (May 24, 2012): 296–317; Cath Collins, Lorena Balardini, and Jo-Marie 
Burt, “Mapping Perpetrator Prosecutions in Latin America,” The International Journal 
of Transitional Justice 7.1 (December 12, 2012): 8–28; Christoph Sperfeldt, 
“Cambodian Civil Society and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal,” The International Journal 
2
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the relationship between international donors and domestic civil 
society actors engaging in alternative post-conflict justice activities, 
including fact-finding initiatives and memory-related projects. As 
research on international aid for post-conflict justice efforts has only 
found limited scholarly attention thus far, this study focuses on 
Scandinavian aid practices in BiH. It explores in particular Sweden 
and Norway’s involvement, as Scandinavian countries have been 
norm-shaping and innovative development actors in the past.7 In 
spite of an increasing number of restorative justice projects 
implemented by local NGOs in BiH, transitional justice aid from 
Scandinavian state donors to Bosnian human rights advocates 
remains insubstantial. This begs the question as to why Norwegian 
and Swedish governments are reluctant to provide financial support 
to local civil society initiatives engaged in post-conflict justice. 
Drawing on extensive fieldwork data, the author argues that several 
factors, including institutional and ideological obstacles, have fueled 
this problematic trend. 
 The first part of this article reviews a selection of the 
literature on post-conflict development and transitional justice to 
stress the importance of interdisciplinary analysis and the role of civil 
society in post-conflict justice contexts. Additionally, it calls for 
further academic research on international donor practices in 
transitional justice contexts to better understand persisting state-
centric aid strategies despite the burgeoning role of NGOs. The 
second part summarizes the research design and methodologies used 
                                                                                                             
of Transitional Justice 6.1 (2012): 149–60; Aron Boesenecker and Leslie Vinjamuri, 
“Lost in Translation? Civil Society, Faith-Based Organizations and the Negotiation 
of International Norms,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 5.3 (2011): 
345–65; E. Haslam, “Subjects and Objects: International Criminal Law and the 
Institutionalization of Civil Society,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 5.2 
(2011): 221–40; Sari Kouvo and Dallas Mazoori, “Reconciliation, Justice and 
Mobilization of War Victims in Afghanistan,” The International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 5.3 (2011): 492–503. 
7 Sunniva Engh and Helge Pharo, “Nordic Cooperation in Providing Development 
Aid,” in Regional Cooperation and International Organizations: The Nordic Model in 
Transnational Alignment, ed. Norbert Götz and Heidi Haggrén (New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 112. 
3
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in this study. The research is based on qualitative data collected 
during extensive fieldwork, including semi-structured interviews, 
government reports and other official documents. Against the 
backdrop of the growing role of post-conflict NGOs in BiH 
presented in the third part of this article, the last part analyses the 
reasons as to why donors are reluctant to support alternative 
transitional justice initiatives led by Bosnian NGOs.  
 
Post-Conflict Development, Transitional Justice and NGOs 
The issues examined in post-conflict development studies, peace 
studies, and transitional justice studies are complementary, leading to 
an increase in interdisciplinary analyses in the last few years.8 Such 
work, however, is still in its initial stages and this article provides 
additional insights for cross-boundary research. At present, it remains 
difficult to link different issues across disciplinary lines. As a case in 
point, transitional justice “often comes to represent a trade-off of 
sorts between justice or development, rather than promoting 
development with justice.”9 In fact, transitional justice is a relatively 
new field. Early literature that influenced transitional justice studies 
was concerned with the question of post-authoritarian regime change 
in different regions across the world, such as Latin America and 
Eastern Europe.10 Practitioners and scholars who built on democratic 
transition concepts eventually coined the term transitional justice in 
                                                 
8 For a discussion on these issues see for instance the special issue on development 
of the International Journal of Transitional Justice, 2 (3), 2008. See also Chandra Lekha 
Sriram et al., Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground: Victims and Ex-
Combatants (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
9 Rama Mani, “Dilemmas of Expanding Transitional Justice, or Forging the Nexus 
between Transitional Justice and Development,” International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 2.3 (2008): 253–65. 
10 See for instance Guillermo O’Donnell and Paul Schmitter, Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: 
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1993); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, 
MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). 
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the 1990s.11 The burgeoning advocacy-oriented work now includes 
legal, normative, socio-political and anthropological scholarship, to 
name only a few areas of inquiry.12 Over time, the thematic and 
geographic map of transitional justice grew globally and, with it, the 
number of those who are involved. The list of actors engaged in 
transitional justice practices today contains not only states, but also 
international organizations, NGOs and individuals.13 
As research in this newly established field transgressed 
disciplinary boundaries, critical debates have emerged, including for 
example work situated at the intersection of post-conflict studies and 
transitional justice.14 While the linkage between these disciplines is a 
positive development, critics of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm,15 
such as Chandra Lekha Sriram, have nonetheless expressed concerns: 
The field known as transitional justice, once potentially 
separate from the field known as peacebuilding, is thus now 
tightly linked to it. This is certainly appropriate and necessary: 
                                                 
11 Neil J. Kritz, Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon With Former 
Regimes: General Considerations (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1995); 
Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 2000). 
For a genealogy of the emergence of the field see Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ 
Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice,” Human 
Rights Quarterly 31.2 (2009): 321–67. 
12 Leslie Vinjamuri and Jack Snyder, “Advocacy and Scholarship in the Study of 
International War Crime Tribunals and Transitional Justice,” Annual Review of 
Political Science 7.1 (2004): 345–62. 
13 Jelena Subotić, “The Transformation of International Transitional Justice 
Advocacy,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 6.1 (2012): 106–25; Christine 
Bell, “Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity and the State of the ‘Field’ or ‘Non-
Field,’” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 3.1 (2009): 5–27; Ruti G. Teitel, 
“Transitional Justice Genealogy,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2003): 69. 
14 See for instance the edited volume on victims and ex-combatants Sriram et al., 
Transitional Justice and Peacebuilding on the Ground.. For work on the nexus between 
peace and justice from an accountability-oriented perspective see Jessica Lincoln, 
Transitional Justice, Peace and Accountability: Outreach and the Role of International Courts 
After Conflict (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis, 2011). 
15 The ‘liberal peacebuilding critique’ is research, which is skeptical about the 
benefits of transforming war-shattered states into liberal democracies with market 
economies. For a detailed discussion see for instance Roland Paris, At War’s End 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
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it would be a mistake to seek to “do justice” in a political 
vacuum, or to seek to build peace without addressing the 
horrors of the recent past. To treat each separately would be 
to risk both. However, the subsumption of transitional justice 
by the liberal peacebuilding apparatus potentially subjects 
transitional justice to some of the same flaws and critiques of 
the peacebuilding agenda.16 
One of the flaws she mentions, for instance, is the culturally 
insensitive institutionalization and liberalization strategies of 
international actors that potentially constitute new sources of 
conflict.17 While her work showcases several issues associated with 
post-conflict development, it does not seek to answer the question of 
why external actors nevertheless continue these practices. Moreover, 
her analysis is centered on a state-level perspective, addressing 
grassroots and civil society initiatives only in passing. To go beyond 
these limitations, the present article particularly explores donor 
practices in view of the role of NGOs in transitional justice contexts. 
Many Bosnian NGOs emerged over the past decade to address 
wrongdoings of the past using completely different strategies than the 
established international and domestic war crimes trials. Yet, despite 
this trend, it is puzzling as to why many external government donors 
have shied away from directly supporting these grassroots transitional 
justice efforts. 
The need to improve the role of civil society in transitional 
justice processes has received some scholarly attention, globally as 
well as regionally.18 Notwithstanding the descriptive insights of 
several cases, little has been written on the relationship between 
                                                 
16 Chandra Lekha Sriram, “Justice as Peace? Liberal Peacebuilding and Strategies of 
Transitional Justice,” Global Society 21.4 (2007): 587. 
17 Sriram, “Justice as Peace?” 586-587. 
18 Martin Albrow, Helmut K. Anheier, and Hakan Seckinelgin, Global Civil Society 
2011: Globality and the Absence of Justice (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pt. 
IV; Olivera Simić and Zala Volčič, eds., Transitional Justice and Civil Society in the 
Balkans (New York: Springer, 2013); Cath Collins, Post-Transitional Justice: Human 
Rights Trials in Chile and El Salvador (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 2011). 
6
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international state donors and local non-profit actors in post-conflict 
justice settings. Instead, scholarship has generally expanded existing 
normative-oriented research. As a case in point, David Backer’s 
study, which is part of this normative body of scholarship, provides a 
general framework to trace the links between civil society activities 
and government practices. He claims that “both government and civil 
society can contribute to and stand to gain from the [post-conflict 
reconciliation] process, but only if they achieve an appropriate 
balance of roles.”19 Contrary to Backer’s work, however, this article 
focuses on the imbalanced roles that are in place. In fact, aid is 
favorably provided to government institutions. The study underlines 
the current struggle of different local NGO initiatives, explaining the 
reasons behind the persistence of state-centric aid. Moreover, Backer 
does not question the impact and influence of international post-
conflict justice advocates, such as organizations including the United 
Nations and the International Center for Transitional Justice, on local 
transitional justice processes. 
Other authors have challenged this trend.20 Unsatisfied with 
the top-down structure applied by international post-conflict actors, 
Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern argue that 
the agenda being set for transitional justice, as it is currently 
constituted, tends to marginalize issues, questions, and 
approaches that might either challenge the forms and norms 
of Western governance, or implicate dominant global 
economic relations in the causes of conflict, rather than its 
solution.21 
                                                 
19 David Backer, “Civil Society and Transitional Justice: Possibilities, Patterns and 
Prospects,” New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 2.3 (2003): 299. 
20 Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, “Whose Justice? Rethinking Transitional 
Justice from the Bottom Up,” Journal of Law and Society 35.2 (2008): 265–92; Anna 
Di Lellio and Caitlin McCurn, “Engineering Grassroots Transitional Justice in the 
Balkans The Case of Kosovo,” Eastern European Politics and Societies: EEPS 27.1 
(2013): 129–48. 
21 Lundy and McGovern, “Whose Justice?”; Di Lellio and McCurn, “Engineering 
Grassroots Transitional Justice,” 274. 
7
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The authors discuss how excluding local communities as active 
participants in transitional justice efforts raises basic questions of 
legitimacy, local ownership, and participation.22 Zala Volčič and 
Olivera Simić’s edited volume contributes to this debate with a 
number of case studies analyzing civil society actors across the 
Balkans.23 The authors take a critical look at national strategies and 
local practices by closely examining international transitional justice 
priorities and exploring the complex justice processes currently 
underway in the region. Jill Irvine and Patrice McMahon’s chapter, 
for example, scrutinizes domestic transitional justice efforts and 
especially the local actors who implement these initiatives.24 Drawing 
on social movement theory, they show that ‘grassroots efforts to 
promote transitional justice must overcome significant obstacles in 
framing issues, creating coalitions and engaging the state.25 Several 
other authors, including Arnaud Kurze and Iva Vukušić, have also 
looked at regional human rights activists and civil society 
organizations involved in the creation of a transnational fact-finding 
initiative.26 They find that in addition to external causes that have 
                                                 
22 Lundy and McGovern, “Whose Justice?”; Di Lellio and McCurn, “Engineering 
Grassroots Transitional Justice,” 266. Their research is grounded in a growing 
scholarship on critical development studies and transitional justice. See also 
Christine Bell, Colm Campbell, and Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “Justice Discourses in 
Transition,” Social & Legal Studies 13.3 (2004): 305–28; Colm Campbell and 
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted Democracies,” 
Human Rights Quarterly 27.1 (2005): 172–213; Peter Uvin, “Difficult Choices in the 
New Post-Conflict Agenda: The International Community in Rwanda after the 
Genocide,” Third World Quarterly 22.2 (2001): 177–89. 
23 Simić and Volčič, Transitional Justice and Civil Society in the Balkans. 
24 Jill A. Irvine and Patrice C. McMahon, “From International Courts to Grassroots 
Organizing: Obstacles to Transitional Justice in the Balkans,” in Transitional Justice 
and Civil Society in the Balkans, ed. Olivera Simić and Zala Volčič, Springer Series in 
Transitional Justice (New York: Springer, 2013), 217–37. 
25 Irvine and McMahon, “ From International Courts to Grassroots Organizing,” 
218-219. 
26 Arnaud Kurze and Iva Vukusic, “Afraid to Cry Wolf: Human Rights Activists’ 
Struggle of Transnational Accountability Efforts in the Balkans,” in Transitional 
Justice and Civil Society in the Balkans, ed. Olivera Simić and Zala Volčič (New York, 
NY: Springer New York, 2013), 201–15. 
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hampered the creation of a regional truth commission, internal 
factors also encumbered the efforts on the ground to establish 
additional measures to deal with past mass atrocities.27  
The focus of this research, however, goes further, exploring 
the link between donor practices and transitional justice. Some recent 
work already examines the effects and impact of local justice in 
relation to global transitional justice practices.28 Although the need to 
address remedies within specific contexts is crucial to successfully 
implement transitional justice strategies, many of the current 
practices fail to embrace locality. As Moses Okello points out, 
“transitional justice language would undeniably have to move from 
hierarchical understanding of justice processes to one based upon 
place.”29 As a result, a number of authors have elaborated on the 
question between a global post-conflict justice discourse, especially in 
view of international law norms, and the consequences of these 
practices on the ground.30 Despite the growing interest in the impact 
of civil society in transitional justice settings, it is still unclear why 
notably innovative and norm-shaping international state donors 
continue with liberal development strategies that are not adequately 
tailored to the needs of local populations. The work by Sara Kendall, 
for instance, addresses this question by framing development and 
post-conflict justice accountability in terms of a market-oriented 
discourse. According to her, the creation of consulting firms by 
former prosecutors and investigators 
illustrates the emerging triangulation between justice, security, 
and development. While the scholarly field of international 
criminal law tends to look inward to its evolving 
                                                 
27 See also Alex Jeffrey, “The Political Geographies of Transitional Justice,” 
Transactions of The Institute of British Geographers 36.3 (2011): 344–59. 
28 Moses Chrispus Okello, “Elevating Transitional Local Justice or Crystallizing 
Global Governance?” in Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities After 
Mass Violence, ed. Rosalind Shaw, Lars Waldorf, and Pierre Hazan (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2010), 275. 
29 Okello, “Elevating Transitional Local Justice,” 281. 
30 Rosalind Shaw and Lars Waldorf with Pierre Hazan, eds., Localizing Transitional 
Justice: Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2010). 
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jurisprudence with the occasional turn to political analysis of 
its structures, the broader relations between tribunals, ‘rule-
of-law’ and governance agendas, and the provision of security 
to foster economic development is rarely considered.31 
Thus, she explores the relationship between normative notions of 
justice and economic liberalism. While her findings stress the 
emerging symbiosis between market-driven objectives and the 
dissemination of international norms, this study scrutinizes the 
imbalanced post-conflict justice support by Western donors who 
favor retributive justice mechanism. It concentrates on Scandinavian 
governments, in particular Sweden and Norway in BiH, with the goal 
of discussing the reasons behind donor practices that rely 
predominantly on war crimes trials and accountability strategies, 
which hamper more comprehensive strategies within Bosnian society.  
 
Research Design and Methodology  
The selection of BiH as a case study is primarily based on its history 
in global politics and international development assistance patterns. 
BiH constitutes a post-conflict zone that has been on the agenda of 
foreign aid donors for more than a decade. The country went 
through multiple assistance phases each of them corresponding to 
various stages of the Balkan conflict, including humanitarian aid, 
post-conflict reconstruction, and, as of now, democratization 
assistance. Therefore, the goal of studying BiH lies in generating new 
insights on current Scandinavian aid strategies. The findings can then 
serve as a catalyst that triggers a broader discussion on post-conflict 
justice funding to implement more comprehensive practices on the 
ground.  
An important number of international development actors, 
such as the European Union (EU), EU member states, the United 
States, and the United Nations (UN), among other states and 
international organizations, have supported and are currently assisting 
BiH during its transition phase. This study, however, focuses on 
                                                 
31 Sara Kendall, “Donors’ Justice: Recasting International Criminal Accountability,” 
Leiden Journal of International Law 24.03 (2011): 605. 
10
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Scandinavian aid, notably on Norwegian and Swedish donor 
assistance with regards to alternative transitional justice mechanisms. 
This choice is based on two reasons. First, despite the important role 
of EU assistance across the former Yugoslavia, Brussels’s 
engagement in comprehensive transitional justice efforts that go 
beyond retributive justice mechanisms remains limited.32 Second, 
Scandinavian states are often seen as ‘norm entrepreneurs’ in world 
politics, especially with regards to the provision of aid.33 While their 
unique position could be instrumental to strengthen bottom-up 
initiatives in post-conflict justice, there has been little involvement in 
either of the two cases. This selection therefore helps to shed light on 
why these countries have not followed previous policy patterns, 
which would consist of spearheading efforts to support new, 
alternative transitional justice practices.34 
 The study is based on extensive fieldwork in BiH between 
2009 and 2011, including over three-dozen interviews with official 
representatives of donor countries, activists and experts. Embassy 
representatives from the Swedish and Norwegian Missions in 
Sarajevo kindly responded to interview requests, providing valuable 
reports and official documentation. Moreover, the research project 
includes interviews with staff of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial 
Council (HJPC),35 the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE), the EU Special Representative, and the OHR. Several 
interviews and discussions with human rights activists including staff 
from the Coalition for RECOM (a regional fact-finding initiative 
                                                 
32 Katy A. Crossley-Frolick, “The European Union and Transitional Justice: 
Human Rights and Post-Conflict Reconciliation in Europe and Beyond,” 
Contemporary Readings in Law and Social Justice 3.1 (2011): 33–57. 
33 Christine Ingebritsen, “Norm Entrepreneurs Scandinavia’s Role in World 
Politics,” Cooperation and Conflict 37.1 (March 1, 2002): 11–23. 
34 Ingebritsen, “Norm Entrepreneurs.” 
35 The HJPC is a national institution that serves as a watchdog within the judicial 
system in BiH. The members of the Council appoint, train, and discipline judges. 
The HJPC is also responsible for advising other government entities about judicial 
budgets and administration. See also HJPC website at http://www.hjpc.ba/, 
accessed January 15, 2013. 
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created in 2008), the Research and Documentation Center, and the 
Youth Initiative for Human Rights in Sarajevo are also a part of the 
project data. The interviewees were chosen by their relevance to the 
current transitional justice process and development aid strategies in 
BiH and supplementary research subjects were added by using 
snowball sampling.36 Several participants agreed to be interviewed 
only under the condition of anonymity. Their institutional affiliation 
is nonetheless indicated. 
In the following, this article provides an overview of Sweden 
and Norway’s current aid for institutional reform and rule of law as 
part of their transitional justice support in BiH. These state-centric 
aid efforts are then contrasted with an analysis of new emerging 
alternative post-conflict justice initiatives by local NGOs. Despite the 
increasing role of civil society in restorative transitional justice efforts 
in BiH, however, Swedish and Norwegian donor practices have not 
adapted new broad strategies to shift larger parts of their aid to local 
NGO actors. Drawing on these observations, the last part explains 
why these changes in aid policies have failed to materialize.  
 
Current Donor Practices and Challenges for Local NGOs  
The primary internationally-sponsored post-conflict justice efforts in 
BiH since the end of the conflict consisted of cooperating with the 
ICTY and after 2005 holding domestic trials at the Court of BiH War 
Crimes Chamber.37 During the past decade, however, civil society 
                                                 
36 Chaim Noy, “Sampling Knowledge: The Hermeneutics of Snowball Sampling in 
Qualitative Research,” International Journal of Social Research Methodology 11.4 (2008): 
327–44. Notwithstanding the openness of interviewees to participate in this study, 
many of them refused to be referenced by their name due to potential political 
consequences on the ground. 
37 Jelena Subotić, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2009); James Gow, “The ICTY, War Crimes 
Enforcement and Dayton: The Ghost in the Machine,” Ethnopolitics 5.1 (2006): 49–
65; Claire Garbett, “Localising Criminal Justice: An Overview of National 
Prosecutions at the War Crimes Chamber of the Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,” Human Rights Law Review 10.3 (2010): 558–68. 
12
Transitional Justice Review, Vol. 1, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 2
https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/tjreview/vol1/iss5/2
 
 
 
 
 
 
47   Time for Change 
 
Transitional Justice Review, Vol.1, Iss.5, 2017, 35-62 
 
actors supporting transitional justice practices have grown.38 
Although Scandinavian donors have a reputation of engaging in 
innovative development policies, post-conflict justice strategies 
pursued in BiH follow more conventional goals—including 
institutional reform and the rule of law, which are also part of the EU 
integration strategy.39 These observations are based on official reports 
issued by the Bosnian government as well as donor reports.  The first 
set of data was extracted from a series of BiH aid reports published 
by the BiH Ministry of Finance and Treasury, between 2006 and 
2012.40 Whereas the reports define ten different sectors that receive 
aid—ranging from environmental protection to education—this 
study focuses only on two sectors—‘Good Governance and 
Institution Building’ henceforth governance and ‘Conflict Prevention 
and Resolution, Peace and Security’ henceforth conflict prevention—
in order to analyze disbursements that are relevant for post-conflict 
justice activities.  
The second set of data was drawn from an analysis of both 
the Norwegian and Swedish project grants since 2000. It exemplifies 
                                                 
38 Iavor Rangelov and Marika Theros, “Transitional Jsutice in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Coherence and Complementarity of EU Institutions and Civil 
Society,” in Building a Future on Peace and Justice: Studies on Transitional Justice, Conflict 
Resolution and Development: The Nuremberg Declaration on Peace and Justice, eds. Kai 
Ambos, Judith Large, and Marieke Wierda (London: Springer, 2009), 362. 
39 Although Norway is not a member of the EU, officials at the Norwegian Mission 
in Sarajevo emphasized that aid policies are increasingly implemented in 
coordination with other bilateral EU member countries and EU staff in BiH. 
Interview by author, 17 May 2011. 
40 BiH Ministry of Finance and Treasury, “Donor Mapping Report 2006,” Donor 
Coordination Forum, 2006; BiH Ministry of Finance and Treasury, “Donor 
Mapping Report 2007,” Donor Coordination Forum, 2007; BiH Ministry of 
Finance and Treasury, “Donor Mapping Report 2009-2008,” Donor Coordination 
Forum, 2009; BiH Ministry of Finance and Treasury, “Donor Mapping Report 
2011-2010,” Donor Coordination Forum, 2011; BiH Ministry of Finance and 
Treasury, “Donor Mapping Report 2012-2011,” Donor Coordination Forum, 2012. 
Although some report data for earlier periods are also available, most of the data 
are missing or were only partially recorded and are therefore inapt for analytical 
purposes. 
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a state-centric disbursement strategy.41 Norway, for example, has 
directed a large part of its post-conflict justice assistance to the 
HJPC. Although the autonomous institution was created in 2004 with 
the goal of promoting general judicial reform in BiH,42 Sven Marius 
Urke, a seconded Norwegian civil servant who is an international 
member of the HJPC,43 believes the HJPC is crucial for promoting 
war crimes prosecutions. To this end, the HJPC appoints judges to 
the War Crimes Chamber (WCC) of the BiH Court, he explained. 
Other members of international organizations share Mr Urke’s view 
and stress the HJPC’s role for transitional justice processes not only 
in BiH, but also across the region.44 One of Norway’s principal aid 
goals therefore consists of a so-called institutional knowledge transfer 
model, in which best practices from the Norwegian judicial system 
are applied to BiH’s judiciary, as some government representatives 
put it.45 Such a strategy remains nonetheless restricted to state 
institutions and government elites rather than including grassroots 
members of society.  
In 2010, an internal evaluation report questions the 
effectiveness of the established goals, stating that “Norway may have 
exited too soon… or has not established operational clarity for 
                                                 
41 See the donor database website from the BiH Ministry of Finance and Treasury 
at http://db.donormapping.ba/, accessed February 3, 2013. The data used for the 
analysis are post-2000, because in the years immediately after the end of the 
conflict donor support consisted primarily of infrastructure-related aid to rebuild 
physical damage within societies. This study, however, is specifically interested in 
aid for post-conflict justice efforts. 
42 Total judicial and legal sector reform funding for the period of 1996-2008 was 
about 10 million Euro ($13.4 million USD), excluding secondment salaries to its 
experts and civil servants working in BiH institutions.  
43 Before becoming an international member of the HJPC, Mr. Urke was also part 
of the international team working on the Independent Judicial Commission (IJC) in 
BiH. 
44 Interviews by author with several members of international organizations, 
including the OSCE, UNDP, and the EU, among others in May 2011. 
45 Interview by author with several representatives of the Norwegian Embassy in 
Sarajevo in May 2011. 
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expected longer-term effects (reconciliation, democratisation).”46 In 
addition, attempts to successfully embrace a more NGO-focused 
approach to implement alternative transitional justice efforts remain 
limited. The report further criticized Norway’s development 
performance in BiH, and since then the government has made an 
effort to strengthen its ties with NGOs on the ground.47 In addition 
to existing smaller projects, the Norwegian government initiated 
support to a handful of projects that include civil society 
organizations, such as the Association of War Victims,48 and Kuca 
Povjerenja49 and the Youth Initiative on Human Rights in BiH.50 Yet, 
these examples reflect neither common donor disbursement patterns, 
nor established aid practices.51 Furthermore, Norwegian post-conflict 
justice projects that promote civil society show only limited signs of 
direct collaboration with local non-profit organizations. This is the 
case with the following two examples that receive Norwegian aid 
support. The International Commission for Missing Persons (ICMP), 
an international non-profit organization established in 1996 to 
monitor state cooperation in locating and identifying the disappeared 
during the conflict, and other regional reconciliatory initiatives, such 
as the Nansen Dialogue Network,52 have had little effect in 
empowering local grassroots actors. Instead of strengthening local 
ownership from the bottom up, these organizations carry out top-
down initiatives and develop sustainable government structures, 
                                                 
46 NORAD, “Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with the 
Western Balkans Volume I” (Oslo: Evaluation Department, Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation, 2010), 5. 
47 NORAD, “Evaluation,” 8. 
48 Support for the Women’s section in form of a knitting program to foster 
inclusion and empowerment. 
49 Support of theatre performance based on a century-old legend in Srebrenica. 
50 Although some of YIHR’s activities are related to transitional justice, many of 
the activities fall into the broader umbrella category of human rights. 
51 For a full list see the Norwegian Embassy’s website at 
http://www.norveska.ba/Embassy/Embassy_Fund/, accessed April 15, 2014.  
52 See official website at http://www.nansen-dialogue.net/, accessed January 7, 
2013. 
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employing international NGOs to implement their work rather than 
handing over responsibility to local actors. 
Despite an NGO-friendly discourse, the Swedish case 
resembles Norwegian practices. The Swedish International 
Development Cooperation Agency, (Sida),53 for instance, summarizes 
Sweden’s main development policy goals as follows: “[The 
cooperation dialogue] with the country’s authorities will mainly be 
focused on closer relations with the EU, but it will also cover… the 
need to continually strengthen civil society and local ownership.”54 
Thus, Sweden’s main concern lies in supporting the EU integration 
process, including coordinating and streamlining multilateral 
development aid efforts.55 Swedish assistance in the governance 
sector concentrates on state prison reform and the support of the 
HJPC. As for the latter, it is very technical and aims at institutional 
reform:  
We have been supporting the HJPC with a case management 
system, an IT system, which… was a very technical project, 
[creating] a link between those technical solutions and making 
the system more effective but also more accountable.56 
Priority is thus given to projects that improve effectiveness and 
accountability of post-conflict justice processes. Additionally, the 
selection of cases illustrates that donors remain in control, managing 
each project through an array of bureaucratic procedures.57 While 
some assistance to civil society initiatives in the conflict prevention 
sector exists, these efforts are very elitist, with donors relying on their 
own domestic civil society actors to implement the support. The 
Swedish government, for instance, uses national non-profit 
                                                 
53 A government agency of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
54 Sida, “Strategy for Development Cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
January 2011 – December 2014” (Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010), 2. 
55 BiH Ministry of Finance and Treasury, “Donor Mapping Report 2012-2011,” 
144, 146. 
56 Interview by author with representative of the Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo, 11 
May 2011. 
57 Interviews by author with several Scandinavian donor officials during fieldwork 
in May 2011. 
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organizations, including the Olof Palme International Center—a 
Sweden-based NGO with ties to the national labour movement—and 
the Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation, which is also headquartered in 
Sweden. Such a trend, however, contributes to a local-international 
disconnect, often ignoring local initiatives within society. This 
disconnect is readily evident when looking at civil society transitional 
justice efforts in BiH. 
To illustrate this issue, the article turns its attention to post-
conflict justice NGO projects, describing their role in the process as 
well as the problems they faced. Regardless of the limited support 
Bosnian civil society actors receive from Scandinavian donors, the 
number of local NGOs supporting alternative transitional justice 
practices in BiH has grown in the past decade. These activities fall 
into different categories, such as documentation, support for criminal 
prosecutions, truth-seeking initiatives, reparations and advocacy of 
victims’ groups, peace-building and reconciliation, memorials, 
education, and public opinion. For this study, the author draws on a 
selection of cases associated with documentation and truth-seeking.58 
                                                 
58 For a discussion on education see Janine Natalya Clark, “Education in Bosnia-
Hercegovina: The Case for Root-and-Branch Reform,” New York Law School Journal 
of Human Rights 9.3 (2010): 344–62; Briony Jones, “Exploring the Politics of 
Reconciliation through Education Reform: The Case of Brčko District, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 6.1 (2012): 126–48; Clare 
Magill, Alan Smith, and Brandon Hamber, The Role of Education in Reconciliation. The 
Perspectives of Children and Young People in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Ireland, 
Special EU Programmes Body (University of Ulster, 2009). For more details on 
reparations see Quirine Eijkman, “Recognising the Local Perspective: Transitional 
Justice and Post-Conflict Reparations,” Global Jurist 10.3 (2010), 
http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/gj.2010.10.3/gj.2010.10.3.1370/gj.2010.10.3.13
70.xml; Stephan Parmentier, Marta Valinas, and Elmar Weitekamp, “How to Repair 
the Harm after Violent Conflict in Bosnia-Results of a Population-Based Survey,” 
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 27 (2009): 27; Amnesty International, “Whose 
Justice? The Women of Bosnia and Herzegovina Still Waiting” (Amnesty 
International Publications, 2009). Alexander Jeffrey’s study examines the role of 
civil society in war crimes prosecutions in BiH. Jeffrey, “The Political Geographies 
of Transitional Justice.” For a study on the question of memorials in Omarska see 
Manuela Brenner, “The Struggle of Memory. Practices of the (Non-) Construction 
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They emphasize not only the importance of NGOs in transitional 
justice contexts, but also reveal the difficulties activists are 
confronted with.  
As early as the beginning of the BiH conflict, different 
organizations started documenting war crimes and missing persons. 
The Research and Documentation Center (RDC) in Sarajevo, for 
instance, created a comprehensive database on human rights 
violations, publishing a book with the findings in 2007 as well as a 
website that uses Google Maps in order to provide information on 
the crime type, the number of victims and their gender, the location 
of the crime, and details about the perpetrator.59 This documentation 
initiative, the ‘Human Losses Project,’ aimed at creating a collective 
memory of the victims in BiH and helped promote a human rights 
dialogue in the country. Yet, RDC’s efforts to quantify the victims of 
the war in the hope of demystifying the number of deaths, fell short 
of reshaping Bosnian public opinion at large. On the contrary, the 
publication of a report that lowered the number of Bosnian 
victims—around 100,000 instead of the 250,000 generally referred to 
in Bosnian society—fueled uproar in Bosniak elite circles and 
triggered threats against the RDC and Mirsad Tokača, its director.60 
In the end, Mr. Tokača’s choice to solely focus on a bottom-up 
perspective without including local elites backfired and ultimately 
                                                                                                             
of a Memorial at Omarska,” Südosteuropa. Zeitschrift Für Politik Und Gesellschaft.03 
(2011): 349. 
59 Lara Nettlefield, “Research and Repercussions of Death Tolls : The Case of the 
Bosnian Book of the Dead,” in Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in 
Global Crime and Conflict, ed. Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2010). 
60 Nettlefield, 186. While this documentation project includes war crimes and 
human rights violations committed across the entire Bosnian territory, more 
locally-oriented initiatives were also launched, such as an archive on the Mostar 
region by the Center for Peace and Interethnic Relationships; see also Olga Martin-
Ortega, “Transitional Justice in the Quest for Just and Durable Peace in Bosnia-
Herzegovina,” in Rethinking Peacebuilding: The Quest for Just Peace in the Middle East and 
the Western Balkans, ed. Karin Aggestam and Annika Björkdahl (London: Routledge, 
2012). 
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sealed the fate of his initiative.61 Even though the project struggled to 
shape a collective memory process in BiH by setting the record of 
war crimes victims straight, it created a number of new 
opportunities.62 Inspired by this impressive project, the OSCE 
launched a website with a BiH war crimes case map in February 
2014, which provides information on all the war crimes cases 
adjudicated in BiH.63 While the OSCE project is less ambitious, it 
nevertheless uses the ideas and technology created at the grassroots 
level, proving the innovative catalyst function of NGOs for 
transitional justice processes in BiH.  
Civil society attempts with the goal of implementing 
restorative justice initiatives, including truth and reconciliation 
commissions, are another fundamental part of post-conflict justice 
processes in BiH.64 Yet, these efforts have also struggled to gain 
international support, such as a regional bottom-up truth and 
reconciliation commission (TRC) attempt. It is called the Regional 
Commission to determine and disclose the facts about war crimes 
committed in the former Yugoslavia, in short: The Coalition for 
RECOM. It was launched in 2008 by a group of NGOs across the 
former Yugoslavia and focused on war crimes in BiH, among other 
issues, and is an excellent showcase of the reluctance expressed by 
public authorities and international donors to support alternative 
post-conflict justice mechanisms.65 While both external and internal 
                                                 
61 Nettlefield, “Research and Repercussions of Death Tolls: The Case of the 
Bosnian Book of the Dead.”, 186-187. 
62 Reminiscent of the RDC’s initiative, the Serbian NGO, Humanitarian Law 
Center, launched its first volume of a book, The Kosovo Memory Book 1998-2000, on 7 
September 2011. 
63 See for instance the website of the OSCE Mission for BiH at 
http://www.warcrimesmap.oscebih.org/, accessed April 17, 2014. 
64 See, for instance, a UN report on various transitional justice mechanisms in post-
conflict contexts. Kofi Annan, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General” (United 
Nations, 2004). 
65 Arnaud Kurze, “Democratizing Justice in the Post-Conflict Balkans: The 
Dilemma of Domestic Human Rights Activists,” CEU Political Science Journal 7.3 
(2012): 254. 
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problems contributed to the fate of RECOM, its innovative regional 
approach created a new space for stalled post-conflict justice 
processes.66 Creating a dialogue with different actors at the local, 
national and international level differs from the war crimes trials 
strategies used until now. Yet, earlier TRC attempts in BiH faced 
similar challenges. Iavor Rangelov and Marika Theros describe the 
difficulties of local NGOs in overcoming institutional obstacles and 
creating sufficient political momentum to implement Bosnian truth 
and reconciliation commissions. They note that: 
Civil society has been both active and largely ignored in the 
process of establishing a [TRC] for BiH. The Citizens 
Association for Truth and Reconciliation was established by 
Jakob Finci in order to lobby for the creation of a TRC. It 
successfully liaised with the [ICTY] and secured their support 
for a truth-telling body. But the draft law that resulted from 
this effort failed to attract political backing. The second TRC 
initiative involved the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) 
taking the lead in partnership with the local NGO Dayton 
Project, created to facilitate the process. This initiative 
coordinated a working group composed of the eight leading 
political parties to draft legislation. It provoked an outcry 
among civil society and the public since both were excluded 
from the process of consultation and negotiation.67 
The above examples highlight the obstacles activists had to overcome 
to implement alternative post-conflict justice mechanisms in BiH, 
while also pointing to the valuable contributions of NGOs to 
improve larger transitional justice processes in this fragile 
environment. More importantly, however, these cases also 
demonstrate that the reasons for the lack of international support are 
complex and often hidden behind multiple layers of problems. The 
intricacies of the RDC and RECOM cases therefore serve as 
                                                 
66 Kurze, 252-253 and Jelena Subotić, “The RECOM Initiative: The Promise and 
Peril of Regional Truth Seeking in the Balkans,” Puls Demokratije, February 10, 
2010. 
67 Rangelov and Theros, “Transitional Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
Coherence and Complementarity of EU Institutions and Civil Society,” 364. 
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excellent examples to illustrate that donors are not the only ones to 
blame for the lack of support. 
 
Reasons for Scandinavian Reluctance to Support Transitional 
Justice NGOs 
Notwithstanding the promising potential of NGOs for transitional 
justice in BiH, progressive and innovative development actors, such 
as Norway and Sweden, have been hesitant to systematically and 
substantially increase their support for post-conflict justice advocacy 
on the ground. Why did Norwegian and Swedish donors give priority 
to government-run projects, instead of supporting local civil society 
initiatives? Analyzing the rationale behind retributive justice 
mechanisms at the ICTY and at the WCC at the BiH Court, this 
section offers an ideological explanation for the poor Scandinavian 
support for restorative transitional justice activism in BiH. This 
explanation is complemented with empirical evidence on current 
institutional conditions, which further fuels this phenomenon. Last, 
the section critically discusses the role of NGO agency in post-
conflict justice efforts.  
Sweden and Norway’s strong adherence to international 
humanitarian law explains their preference to support domestic war 
crimes trials and retributive justice related projects instead of 
alternative transitional justice initiatives by civil society. These 
normative beliefs were predominantly shaped by international war 
crimes trials for the former Yugoslavia put in place by the ICTY. In 
fact, the creation of the UN ad hoc Tribunal constituted a watershed 
moment leading to a spill-over effect of international humanitarian 
law across the region and worldwide.68 Due to the difficulties faced 
by the Tribunal in The Hague, ICTY advocates—such as its first 
Chief Prosecutor Richard Goldstone—were initially against any truth 
                                                 
68 Robert Cryer and Paul Mora, “I. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and 
International Criminal Law: Backing the Future?” The International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 59.03 (2010): 805; Mark Drumbl, Atrocity, Punishment, and International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 46; Ruti G. Teitel, “Global Transitional 
Justice,” Center for Global Studies Working Paper Series on Human Rights, Global Justice & 
Democracy.8 (Spring 2010). 
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commission attempts. They believed this would undermine the 
initially fragile work of the Tribunal.69 While this discourse changed 
over time to include more comprehensive practices,70 accountability 
efforts in The Hague and across many Balkan states continued to 
follow a results-driven dogma to equate a successful transition model 
with the number of processed war crimes cases.71 Indeed, 
Scandinavian donors are among the supporters who prioritize 
bilateral aid for war crimes trials to systematically measure the 
outcome of their aid allocations.72 A Norwegian official even stressed 
the importance of ‘streamlining’ these funding processes to improve 
efficiency and transparency.73 
 Moreover, adequate evaluation processes and assessment 
practices, including streamlining, are important cornerstones in 
Scandinavian donor strategies. Years of prosecutions in The Hague 
and at domestic courts in BiH produced a large archive of detailed 
court records, triggering a culture of assessment at the ICTY and in 
the Balkans. By increasing the number of war crimes sentences, 
retributive justice advocates sought to optimize international criminal 
law. Donors, such as Norway and Sweden, willingly funded judiciary 
and prosecutorial activities as aid effectiveness could be easily 
assessed.74 These assessments were for the most part based on widely 
disseminated ICTY accountability guidelines.75 As a case in point, the 
findings and recommendations of an international evaluation report 
on the BiH State Court – which also included a Norwegian donor 
                                                 
69 Viktor Peskin, International Justice in Rwanda and the Balkans: Virtual Trials and the 
Struggle for State Cooperation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 41–43. 
70 Annan, “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict 
Societies: Report of the Secretary-General.” 
71 OSCE, “Delivering Justice in BiH: An Overview of War Crimes Processing from 
2005 to 2010” (Sarajevo: OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2010). 
72 Interviews by author with Scandinavian donor officials and EU representatives in 
May 2011. 
73 Interview by author with representative of the Norwegian Embassy on May 17, 
2011. 
74 Interview by author with representative of the Norwegian Embassy. 
75 See ICTY website at http://www.icty.org, accessed February 17, 2013. 
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report –used statistical data confirming these ICTY objectives.76 
Many of the studies documented the exact number of completed 
cases by the court and employ quantitative analysis, such as bar 
graphs, pie charts, and statistical forecasts. In addition, an OSCE 
report, which compared the outcomes and the work performance of 
the judiciary’s war crimes section, observed that the prosecution of 
war criminals in BiH progressively improved since 2005. One of the 
figures at the end of the report, for instance, indicated that the 
number of accused brought to trial annually from January 2005 until 
September 2010 rose from 16 in 2005 to 28 in 2010.77 As a result, 
collecting and evaluating statistical trial data became an integral part 
of a performance monitoring policy by Norway and Sweden. Their 
transitional justice aid strategies were thus conditioned by prevailing 
war crimes trials and accountability efforts.  
 The impact assessment of alternative transitional justice 
efforts, however, represents an intricate task as quantifying and 
measuring restorative, reconciliatory, and memory-centered projects 
in post-conflict societies poses many difficulties. Not surprisingly, 
local NGOs are less inclined to employ assessment and streamlining 
processes in their work on restorative post-conflict justice efforts. As 
a consequence, Scandinavian donors were skeptical and expressed 
concerns as to how some of the local alternative transitional justice 
practices could be properly measured and their outcomes evaluated.78 
These obstacles persist and pose a real conundrum with some 
scholars and practitioners arguing that only long-term assessments 
can provide answers to questions on reconciliation and how to deal 
with the past within traumatized societies.79 While others also 
                                                 
76 NORAD, “Evaluation of Norwegian Development Cooperation with the 
Western Balkans Volume I.” 
77 OSCE, “Delivering Justice in BiH: An Overview of War Crimes Processing from 
2005 to 2010,” 98. 
78 Interviews by author with several Scandinavian donor officials during fieldwork 
in May 2011. 
79 Eric Stover and Harvey M. Weinstein, My Neighbor, My Enemy: Justice and 
Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2004). 
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questioned the performance-driven evaluation trend,80 it nevertheless 
incited positive change. On the one hand, regardless of the challenges 
of generating statistically meaningful data, some NGOs developed 
quantitative evaluation tools to measure reconciliatory post-conflict 
activities. The creation of databases with archives of missing persons 
and documentation of war crimes and other human rights violations 
serve as excellent examples.81 On the other hand, human rights 
activists felt the pressure and adapted to this environment. For 
instance, several organizations expanded their institutional knowledge 
and initiated processes to reform their organizational structures; both 
reforms are important steps in the eyes of Scandinavian donors to 
build aid recipients’ capacity and legitimacy.82 
The question of local NGO capacity, however, is a double-
edged sword, further exacerbating the range of Norwegian and 
Swedish grassroots support. In fact, Scandinavian aid agencies do not 
necessarily recognize the potential and power of civil society for 
transitional justice due to the institutional gap that runs between 
donors and recipients on the ground, as a Swedish representative 
described: 
Our support is very much focused on our partners and the 
governments in the countries themselves. This is a very 
significant aspect of how we work, which comes from top-
down. It comes from above; it comes from these global 
processes; it comes from Stockholm headquarters; rather than 
specific experiences in the field… Administratively, we can’t 
work with smaller NGOs. When we get requests from local 
NGOs, we say no straight away, because our aid agenda 
                                                 
80 Hugo Van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter, and Audrey R. Chapman, eds., Assessing 
the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2009); Geoff Dancy, “Impact Assessment, 
Not Evaluation: Defining a Limited Role for Positivism in the Study of 
Transitional Justice,” The International Journal of Transitional Justice 4.3 (2010): 355. 
81 Interviews by author with representatives of the Research and Documentation 
Center on May 17, 2011. 
82 Interviews by author with representatives of the Norwegian Embassy and the 
EU Delegation in Sarajevo in May 2011. 
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stipulates that we should work on fewer but larger projects. 
There is a whole bunch of steps that we have to go through 
in our own internal procedures—both in terms of making the 
assessment and in terms of carrying out the administrative 
tasks—that take a lot of time. We wouldn’t be able to manage 
if we had lots of projects.83 
Defending the institutional top-down structures and processes in 
place, a Norwegian representative argued that “We are trying to 
balance this as well as we can and we could have been much more 
into smaller, local organizations, if we were better staffed.”84 
According to her, it is the responsibility of local advocacy leaders to 
seek funding support by initiating a dialogue with the Norwegian 
Embassy in Sarajevo. On the topic of the NGO, RECOM, for 
instance, she explained: 
Since I’ve been here, we haven’t been working with 
[RECOM]. I don’t know very much about them and they 
haven’t been here to present their work. But [introducing 
your work to donors] is how we get aware of you. If there is a 
project that would like to receive Norwegian funding… then 
[the NGO leaders] should come here and tell us what they 
would like to do. 85 
With regards to other required steps in the funding process, she 
continued that a project proposal is based on the art of grant writing, 
requiring specific resources and skills: 
A good proposal is indicative about a stringent way of 
thinking. It helps [the applicant] to ask basic questions, such 
as: what aspects are the most important? What would they 
exactly like to do? It also helps them to prioritize the issues, 
because they have to fill in a form describing the entire 
                                                 
83 Interview by author with representative of the Swedish Embassy in Sarajevo on 
May 11, 2011. 
84 Interview by author with representative of the Norwegian Embassy in Sarajevo 
on May 17, 2011. 
85 Interview by author with representative of the Norwegian Embassy. 
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process. And in the end they have to show that they deliver, 
so that they can ask for more funding the next year. 86 
Oftentimes, however, applying for funds requires filling in very 
lengthy and technical application forms. Activists working for smaller 
local organizations do not have the means to cope with these 
challenges. On the contrary, several local NGO representatives 
complained that they often lack the staff and expertise in grant 
writing to apply for available funds.87 As a result, the absence of these 
essential skills frequently impedes many local organizations from 
establishing sustainable professional relations with Scandinavian 
donors. The above elaboration of the varied issues demonstrates that 
determining a scapegoat for the absence of grassroots funding for 
restorative justice mechanisms is difficult.88 While ideologically driven 
Norwegian and Swedish development strategies are partly to blame 
for this controversial trend, civil society organizations carry 
nonetheless a degree of responsibility to improve their relationship 
with Scandinavian donors. 
 
Conclusion 
This article discussed the role of two international donors, Sweden 
and Norway, and their aid engagement with local NGOs carrying out 
restorative justice projects, such as fact-finding initiatives and 
memory-related projects. The author argued that despite a growing 
number of restorative justice projects by civil society organizations in 
BiH, post-conflict justice aid from Scandinavian donors to Bosnian 
NGOs working in the field remain very limited. Drawing on 
extensive fieldwork data, he illustrated that different factors, 
including institutional and ideological obstacles, were at the heart of 
                                                 
86 Interview by author with representative of the Norwegian Embassy. 
87 Interviews by author with representatives of the Coalition for RECOM, Youth 
Initiative for Human Rights BiH and Research and Documentation Center in May 
2011. 
88 A related issue in this context is the politicization of aid. United States foreign aid 
policies are an excellent example of this problem. For an in-depth discussion of this 
issue see Carol Lancaster, Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
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this problem. In the first part, he reviewed a selection of post-
conflict, development and transitional justice literature, highlighting 
the importance of interdisciplinary analysis and the role of NGOs in 
transitional justice processes. Furthermore, he pointed to the need of 
further scholarship on international donor practices in transitional 
justice contexts to better understand persisting state-centric aid 
policies. In the second part, he outlined the research design and 
methodology. The third part focused on the growing but difficult role 
of NGOs in post-conflict contexts. Finally, the article scrutinized the 
reasons as to why donors remain reluctant to support alternative 
transitional justice initiatives led by Bosnian NGOs.  
 These findings have important implications for policy 
strategies not only in the region, but also for transitional justice donor 
practices in other post-conflict contexts. First, the study stresses the 
difficulties with regards to policy coordination. Despite collaborative 
efforts of different agencies and various donor countries on large 
transitional justice projects, the relationship between actors on the 
ground and their international counterparts who support local efforts 
is weak. While the above case study illustrates the obstacles in view of 
a holistic post-conflict justice strategy largely due to the persisting 
political challenges, these conditions are not unique to the former 
Yugoslavia. In fact, Tunisia’s transition process faces similar issues. 
The Tunisian political elite that still consists in large part of members 
of the old regime is grappling with a political force that for decades 
was constrained to operate in the opposition, made up mainly of 
Ennahda’s Islamists. Second, establishing a sustainable working 
relationship between donors and local actors requires trust and 
availability. Often, however, donors are not aware of local projects 
and initiatives that need funding due to a limited network of partners 
and resources. Consequently, it is not only the responsibility of 
international donors to reach out to local actors. Instead, grassroots 
activists and smaller civil society organizations are also responsible 
for mobilizing their local resources to receive funding for their ideas 
and initiatives. It is time for both sides—civil society actors engaged 
in restorative justice activities and Scandinavian donors—to enhance 
collaborative efforts by mapping common guidelines to ensure access 
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to smaller funding for local organizations, streamlined outcome 
assessments, and the creation of stronger relations between state 
institutions and society in BiH. The potential for such a dialogue 
exists, and the moment for encouraging the necessary steps to bridge 
this gap is now. 
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